African heads of state meet today in Addis Ababa to endorse the emergency catch-up plan led by UNAIDS to accelerate HIV treatment in West and Central Africa.

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reiterates its call for a clear roadmap and strong political commitment from affected governments and all international stakeholders, towards removing longstanding barriers and implementing proven simplified strategies that will boost lifesaving treatment for 4.7 million living with HIV not yet accessing antiretroviral therapy (ARV).

Lower rates of HIV prevalence in the region’s 21 countries, ranging from two to 10 per cent, have long resulted in less attention and investment in its overall HIV response. Here, only 28 per cent of people and 20 per cent of children living with HIV have access to ARV, resulting in high numbers of deaths and an incidence outpacing treatment initiations.

MSF’s related Out of Focus report, released in April 2016, identified numerous critical obstacles that prevent the wider scale-up of HIV treatment in the region.

Faced with these obstacles, staff in MSF-supported HIV hospital centres in Conakry, Guinea and Kinshasa, DRC report that in the last quarter of 2016, patients arrived in such advanced stages of HIV that 43 per cent and 36 per cent of them respectively died during admission. Around third of these died within 48 hours admission.

Today’s meeting is aimed at deepening engagement from governments, key policy makers and donors towards the implementation of a regional emergency HIV plan and furthering country-specific acceleration plans in fourteen priority countries to start.*

MSF strongly commends the vital leadership shown by UNAIDS and African states in initiating the Acceleration Plan. African leaders are urged to address any limiting factors which may prevent its full realisation.

These include legal and policy blockages, centralised health systems, weak procurement and supply chain management, financial barriers, including user fees for patients, and high levels of stigma. MSF also asks for the Acceleration Plan to soon include remaining countries in the region that face similar treatment gaps.

“This is a pivotal opportunity to anchor governments’ efforts in clearly defined and inclusive country action plans that tackle the many obstacles people living with HIV face every day,” said Joanne Liu, MSF International President.

”Each patient presenting with late stage AIDS in our hospitals is a terrible testimony to these challenges. Our patients tell us often of unimaginable suffering simply trying to access diagnosis and treatment: empty shelves, insurmountable fees and transport costs, long queues, and stigma and discrimination in health facilities.”

Key strategies central to the HIV response in southern and eastern Africa during the 2000s would strongly support a wider response based on quality care for patients. Along with other organisations, MSF calls for the elimination of user fees that would enable a move to ‘test and start’ (immediate treatment on diagnosis) and keep people healthy on lifelong treatment.

Improvements in supply management and last mile delivery should also include strong monitoring mechanisms of stock outs by civil society and patient organisations.

Reaching wider numbers will require the implementation of ‘task-shifting’, whereby basic tasks are delegated to nurses and lay health workers to carry out tests, prescribe and dispense ARVs, counsel patients and contact defaulters.

MSF has successfully piloted these so-called ‘differentiated models of care’ in Kinshasa, DRC and Zemio, Central African Republic (CAR), allowing the decentralisation of simplified HIV service delivery models to health facility and community levels.

The role played by civil society and patient associations in the HIV response is essential. MSF witnesses the reluctance of health ministries and governments and international implementing partners to fully include civil society and communities service delivery, testing and adherence support, as well as stigma reduction activities and service monitoring.

The ‘community treatment observatories’ now running in Burkina Faso, Cameroon and DRC are strong examples of this watchdog function.  These valuable entities require steady funding and technical support and should be scaled up in all countries in the region.

“West Africa, civil society and communities of people living with HIV remain isolated and under-funded, with little support from international civil society, governments and donors,” said Amanda Banda, MSF’s HIV advocacy coordinator.

“In Eastern and Southern Africa, engaging people living with HIV in the responses contributed to vigorous achievements overall in increasing antiretroviral coverage, support and care. We need to invigorate treatment literacy, which gives people autonomy over their care, and address stigmatising attitudes.”

*Benin, Burkina Faso, CAR, Cameroon, DRC, Gabon, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Chad, Togo, Senegal and Sierra Leone (UNAIDS).

Every year a quarter of all international aid – approximately US$15 billion – is spent on capacity development. However, despite the continued dominance of capacity development, results are frequently disappointing.

Over a period of six years, the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) has conducted a series of studies on state capacity in eight countries, focusing on the ways in which international actors attempt to build the capacity of states in fragile and conflict-affected situations to deliver services – typically considered a ‘core function’ of any modern state. This report synthesises the findings of these studies, drawing out cross-cutting themes that help us understand both the ways in which capacity development in such contexts is currently undertaken, and the assumptions, challenges and trade-offs that underpin this practice.

This report is one of a series produced at the end of SLRC’s first phase. These reports bring together and analyse all relevant material on SLRC’s overarching research questions, with a view to drawing out broader lessons that will be of use to policy makers, practitioners and researchers.

State-building has provided the framework for international engagement in countries affected by conflict for at least the past decade. Service delivery is considered one of the few viable ‘entry points’ into this complex enterprise, offering donors and agencies a relatively tangible means of supporting these processes. The central logic here is that, by building governments’ capacity to deliver their ‘core functions’ – such as basic services, security and order – it is simultaneously possible to heal the strained relationships between citizens and state actors, which is, in turn, considered good for peacebuilding.

The problem is that this logic is based more on received wisdom than empirical evidence. While lessons from history suggest that public service provision has often been a central component of the social contracts that accompany processes of state formation, these ideas have been applied to modern state-building policy in a fairly reductive fashion and with little in the way of updated empirical support. The Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) has attempted to help change that: since 2011, SLRC has carried out a series of studies designed to test some of the assumptions that underpin much of the aid spending in this area. The purpose of this report is to synthesise and make sense of this collection of studies.

This report is one of a series produced at the end of SLRC’s first phase. These reports bring together and analyse all relevant material on SLRC’s overarching research questions, with a view to drawing out broader lessons that will be of use to policy makers, practitioners and researchers.

Helping economies recover in the aftermath of war is a top policy priority for international donors and aid agencies, motivated by perceptions that persisting economic grievances are capable of sliding countries back into violence. However, while post-conflict economic programming is often aimed at resuscitating markets and developing the private sector, there is limited evidence to support investments in these areas.

This report synthesises findings on markets and economic development from the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC), a six-year, eight-country research programme exploring how people make a living, access adequate food, educate their children and stay healthy in a range of conflict-affected countries.

This report is one of a series produced at the end of SLRC’s first phase. These reports bring together and analyse all relevant material on SLRC’s overarching research questions, with a view to drawing out broader lessons that will be of use to policy makers, practitioners and researchers.

BACKGROUND

Fall Armyworm (Spodoptera frugiperda), FAW, is an insect pest that feeds on more than 80 crop species, causing damage to economically important cultivated cereals such as maize, rice, sorghum, and also to legumes as well as vegetable crops and cotton.

It is native to tropical and subtropical regions of the Americas, with the adult moth able to move over 100 km per night. It lays its eggs on plants, from which larvae hatch and begin feeding. High infestations can lead to significant yield loss. Farmers in the Americas have been managing the pest for many years, but at significant cost.

Nature of the threat and its spread in Africa

FAW was first detected in Central and Western Africa in early 2016 (Sao Tome and Principe, Nigeria, Benin and Togo) and in late 2016 and 2017 in Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and it is expected to move further.

Although it is too early to know the long-term impact of FAW on agricultural production and food security in Africa, it has the potential to cause serious damage and yield losses.

FAW’s presence in Africa is irreversible. Large-scale eradication eorts are neither appropriate nor feasible.

Gathering and analyzing experiences and best practices from the Americas will help design and test a sustainable FAW management program for smallholders in Africa.

FAO immediate response to FAW

FAO took immediate actions to support countries in responding to the threat of FAW in Africa.

A consultative meeting was held in Harare, Zimbabwe (14-16 February 2017) with government ocials and stakeholders from Southern Africa to provide an update on the current situation, and support emergency preparedness and rapid pest management response. FAO undertook a series of quick actions such as the development and sharing with countries of a technical guide for FAW identification, protocols to assess levels of infestation and damage, and recommendations for management options including support to governments in the development of action plans.

Two further meetings on FAW, one for the SADC region as follow-up to the Harare consultative meeting and a second one (All Africa) jointly organized by FAO, AGRA and CIMMYT, were held in Nairobi (25-28 April 2017). The All Africa meeting gathered partners from governments, national, regional and international research and development institutions, academia and donor agencies as well as representatives from the private sector. The meeting came up with a set of action points and recommendations addressing research gaps, need for more knowledge on the pest’s behavioural and biological adjustments to African ecological context, monitoring, early warning and forecasting, contingency planning, impact assessment, short-, medium- and long-term measures for management of the pest.

The meeting participants also agreed that FAO should take a lead coordination role in FAW response in Africa.

FAO support to governments and farmers to manage FAW

FAO recommends and is taking leadership in helping member countries, farmers’ organizations, and individual farmers to sustainably manage FAW through:

Short-term measures

In the short term, FAO through South-South Cooperation will bring the expertise and knowledge gained from relevant sources and adapt them to Africa.

From this knowledge, recommended components of a sustainable management program for farmers will be designed. Special attention will be paid to recommendations on targeted pesticide use and the use of biological control.

The recommendations will be tested and adapted to local conditions across Africa via the Farmers’ Field Schools that FAO has supported: farmers and communities will carry out adaptive research to refine sustainable pest management recommendations.

Communicational and educational material in local languages will be produced and distributed, along with key messages for local radio transmission.

Community-based Integrated Pest Management (IPM) programmes using an agro-ecosystems approach and using Farmer Field Schools will be implemented.
See Annex A on pesticide use

Medium-term measures

In the medium-term, FAO will support African countries’ understanding and knowledge on how to sustainably manage FAW, based on area-wide monitoring, consolidated knowledge on the developing patterns and ecology of FAW in Africa as well as reliable data on yield losses and socio-economic impact:

• FAO to support African countries in designing appropriate pest management approaches on the FAW.

• Deepen South-South cooperation to fully integrate experience from the Americas in the long-term management of FAW in Africa.
  There are many farmers, researchers and extension workers who have large experience in managing FAW in the Americas.

• See Annex B on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs)

Long-term measures (incorporating relevant research results)

Development of long-term solutions must be based on using a truly agro-ecosystems approach to FAW management based on the experience from the Americas and integrating relevant research results.

Develop sustainable farming systems using IPM and innovative technologies with an emphasis on preventive measures and particular focus on agronomic practices, use of adapted and tested tolerant/resistant varieties, comprehensive biological control programmes which combines importation and release of proven beneficial organisms from the Americas (provided pre-release investigations are successfully completed) and enhancing indigenous natural enemies, combined with innovative pest surveillance and forecasting technologies.

WEST AFRICA BECOMES THE 1ST REGION IN THE WORLD TO ADOPT A REGIONAL PLAN OF ACTION

A new milestone in the fight against statelessness

After the three-day regional ministerial level meeting hosted by the Government of the Gambia and jointly organized by ECOWAS and UNHCR, the 15 ECOWAS Member States reviewed and validated a regional plan of action to eradicate statelessness by 2024, now referred to as the “Banjul Plan of Action”.
During the first two days of the meeting, the 15 Government focal points for statelessness issues, designated under Article 22 of the Abidjan Declaration, reviewed the plan of action, which elaborates concrete measures and specific timeframes that aim at resolving obstacles to the acquisition of nationality in the region.

The Banjul Plan of Action was validated on 9 May 2017 by the 15 ministers responsible for nationality issues. It was then adopted at the ECOWAS Council of Ministers, in Monrovia, Liberia, on 2 June 2017 and thereby became a legally binding document. Through this bold effort, West Africa confirms its worldwide leadership in the fight against statelessness.

High-level participants included the Vice-President of the Gambia, Ms. Fatoumata Jallow Tambajang, who commended the region’s determination “to address the root causes of statelessness”; the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for West Africa and the Sahel, Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, who stressed the importance of putting in place a robust regional institutional and legal framework to eradicate statelessness; the Assistant High Commissioner for Refugees (Protection), Mr. Volker Türk, who highlighted the exemplary commitment of the ECOWAS Member States in validating this “unique and inspiring” plan of action .

L’AFRIQUE DE L’OUEST, 1ERE REGION DU MONDE A ADOPTER UN PLAN D’ACTION REGIONAL

Une nouvelle étape dans la lutte contre l’apatridie

A l’issue de la réunion régionale ministérielle de 3 jours, accueillie par le gouvernement de la Gambie, et organisée conjointement par la CEDEAO et le HCR, les 15 Etats membres de la CEDEAO ont révisé et validé un plan d’action pour éradiquer l’apatridie d’ici à 2024, désormais connu sous le nom de « Plan d’action de Banjul ».

Pendant les 2 premiers jours de la réunion, les points focaux apatridie des 15 gouvernements, désignés en application de l’article 22 de la Déclaration d’Abidjan, ont révisé le plan d’action, lequel contient des mesures concrètes assorties d’un calendrier précis pour éliminer les obstacles existants à l’acquisition d’une nationalité dans la région.

Les ministres en charge des questions de nationalité des 15 Etats membres ont validé le plan le 9 mai. Il a ensuite été adopté par le Conseil des Ministres de la CEDEAO à Monrovia, au Liberia le 2 Juin, devenant ainsi un document juridiquement contraignant. A travers ces initiatives, l’Afrique de l’Ouest confirme sa position de championne dans la lutte contre l’apatridie.

De nombreuses personnalités de haut niveau ont participé à la réunion, notamment la Vice-présidente de la Gambie, Mme Fatoumata Jallow Tambajang, qui a salué la détermination de la sous-région à s’attaquer « aux racines profondes de l’apatridie »; Le Représentant spécial du Secrétaire Général des Nations unies pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest et le Sahel, Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, qui a insisté sur l’importance d‘établir un cadre politique et juridique commun pour l’éradication de l’apatridie et le Haut-Commissaire Assistant du HCR pour la Protection, M. Volker Türk, qui a souligné l’exemplarité dont faisait preuve les Etats membres de la CEDEAO en validant ce plan d’action « unique et inspirant ».

I. Introduction

1. In a letter dated 29 December 2016 (S/2016/1129), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) until 31 December 2019 and requested me to submit a report every six months on the implementation of its mandate. The present report covers the period from 1 January to 30 June 2017 and provides an overview of developments and trends in West Africa and the Sahel. It also outlines the activities of UNOWAS and progress made in the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel.

II. Developments and trends in West Africa and the Sahel

1. The reporting period was characterized by the peaceful resolution of the postelection crisis in the Gambia; government initiatives to promote development in Cabo Verde and Ghana; and political reforms and electoral preparations in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Senegal. While some headway was made in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism, the security situation in West Africa and the Sahel remained fragile. Terrorist activities and cross-border criminality, notably piracy and trafficking in drugs, arms and persons, continued to pose serious threats to the stability of the region. Despite regional efforts to counter Boko Haram, continuing violence has deepened a serious humanitarian crisis and development deficit in the Lake Chad basin. During a visit from 2 to 7 March 2017, a delegation from the Security Council took stock of the situation and raised awareness of the crisis. The visit led to the adoption of resolution 2349 (2017) on 31 March. Meanwhile, at the fifty-first ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), held in Monrovia on 4 June, the President of Togo, Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé, was elected Chair.

A. Political and governance trends

1. On 19 January 2017, the President of the Gambia, Adama Barrow, was sworn in at the embassy of the Gambia in Dakar, where he had temporarily relocated for security reasons following the refusal by the former President, Yahya A. J. J. Jammeh, to accept defeat in the presidential election held on 1 December 2016. Diplomatic efforts made by the Heads of State of the member countries of ECOWAS, with the support of my Special Representative for West Africa and the Sahel, pursuant to Security Council resolution 2337 (2017), resulted in the departure of the former President from the country on 21 January 2017. President Barrow returned to the Gambia on 26 January and began focusing efforts on establishing a new cabinet, supporting the preparation and conduct of legislative elections and developing a joint vision for the country, in consultation with members of the ruling coalition. In the legislative elections, held on 6 April, the United Democratic Party, a party in the ruling coalition led by the current Minister for Foreign Affairs, A. N. M. Ousainou Darboe, secured an absolute majority in the National Assembly.

2. In Cabo Verde, the Government, led by the Prime Minister, José Ulisses Correia e Silva, advanced its reform agenda focused on privatization, decentralization and investment in the tourism sector.

3. In Ghana, the President, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, appointed 54 ministers and deputy ministers to serve in his cabinet, increasing the total number of ministers to 110, up from 78 under the previous Administration. The Government immediately began implementing its key priorities of job creation; economic stabilization; the creation of a business-friendly environment; the revival of the country’s agricultural sector; and investment in the health sector.

4. In Côte d’Ivoire, a new Government, under the leadership of the Prime Minister, Amadou Gon Coulibaly, was appointed on 11 January. In line with the provisions approved through a constitutional referendum in October 2016, Daniel Kablan Duncan, who had served as Prime Minister during the first term in office of the President, Alassane Ouattara, assumed the newly created post of Vice-President. Since January, the country has experienced a series of revolts and mutinies by soldiers demanding monetary compensation from the Government. These incidents underscore the challenges that remain to be addressed in the area of security sector reform.

5. In Guinea, the opposition deplored the fact that local elections were not held in February, as stipulated in the political agreement of 12 October 2016 between the Government and the opposition. A number of steps still need to be taken before local elections can be organized, including the approval by the Constitutional Court of a bill reforming the Electoral Code.

6. In Senegal, preparations are under way for parliamentary elections on 30 July. The amendment to the electoral law adopted on 3 January by the National Assembly included the addition of 15 parliamentary seats to represent the diaspora. Meanwhile, the arrest and indictment on 7 March of the Mayor of Dakar, Khalifa Sall, a possible presidential contender for the elections in 2019, on charges of fraud, triggered heated debate over the independence of the judiciary.

7. In Sierra Leone, the President, Ernest Bai Koroma, announced on 14 February that presidential and legislative elections would be held on 7 March 2018 and that a constitutional referendum would be held by September 2017.

8. In Liberia, preparations continued for the presidential election scheduled for 10 October.

9. In Togo, the Government took a number of measures in connection with the holding of the long overdue local elections and the reforms that remained pending under the comprehensive political agreement of 2006. Notably, a national committee for reflection on constitutional reform was established on 3 January to propose reforms in concert with the High Commission for Reconciliation and Strengthening of National Unity. The payment of reparations to the victims of the political violence that prevailed between 1958 and 2005, in line with the recommendations of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, began in March. Moreover, on 19 January, a National Council for Monitoring Decentralization  was established and the High Authority for Combating Corruption and Related Offences commenced operations. However, opposition leaders denounced the measures as insufficient and reiterated their demands for the holding of local elections.

10. In Benin, the National Assembly failed to secure the majority required to consider the constitutional reforms proposed by the President, Patrice Athanase Guillaume Talon, including the imposition of a single six-year presidential term; public funding of political parties; and the prohibition of pretrial detention and police custody for incumbent presidents and cabinet members.

11. In Burkina Faso, against the backdrop of a worsening security situation, including protests by police personnel, on 20 February, the President, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, appointed Jean-Claude Bouda as Minister of Defence. One week later, the President also replaced the heads of the police and the armed forces. In addition, a new Ministry of Security was created in February and steps were taken to implement a strategic plan on the reform of the defence sector for the period 2017-2021. Following the finalization of the constitutional reform proposals by the Constitutional Committee on 10 January, regional consultations were held between 18 March and 20 April and a referendum on their adoption is expected to be held later in 2017.

12. In the Niger, the political situation continued to be marked by tensions between the ruling majority and the opposition. Local elections previously scheduled to be held in January were postponed indefinitely. The opposition candidate in the second round of the 2016 presidential election, Hama Amadou, was sentenced in absentia on 13 March to one year in prison on child smuggling charges. On 21 April, in response to a series of student strikes, some of which involved violent clashes with security forces, the Government signed an agreement with student representatives, in which it committed to reducing the backlog on scholarship grants and investing in building additional university infrastructure. In addition, in a cabinet reshuffle on 18 April, the President decided that the Minister of Employment, Labour and Social Protection would take the role of the Minister of Higher Education, and vice versa.

13. In Mauritania, on 17 March, the Senate rejected a draft law for constitutional reform, which included the abolishment of the Senate and significant changes to the Constitutional Council and the High Court of Justice, as well as a modification to the national flag. The draft law had been passed by a majority of the National Assembly one week earlier. On 20 April, the Council of Ministers adopted a decree for a referendum on the draft law, which is planned for 15 July. 

14. In Nigeria, on 5 April, following a series of protests against socioeconomic hardship held in several cities, the President, Muhammadu Buhari, launched the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan, 2017-2020. The Government also continued to pursue its efforts to combat corruption. In that regard, on 19 April, the head of the National Intelligence Agency and the Secretary to the Government of the Federation were suspended in connection with the alleged misappropriation of public funds. Notwithstanding these positive developments, national debate centred on the President’s long absences from the country on medical grounds.

B. Security trends

1. Instability in Mali continued to spread into north-eastern Burkina Faso and the western area of the Niger. On 2 March, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al Mourabitoun, Ansar Eddine and Front de libération du Macina merged to form a new alliance, the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, which is composed of leaders of different ethnic backgrounds. The Group has already claimed responsibility for several deadly attacks against the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and Malian forces and is expected to continue carrying out such attacks. In Burkina Faso, the number of terrorist attacks against military and civilian targets increased during the first quarter of the year.  In the Niger, terrorist and violent extremist activity spread from the north of the country and contributed to Boko Haram militant activities in the south. On 26 April, representatives of the Liptako-Gourma Integrated Development Authority, a regional organization seeking to develop the contiguous areas of Mali, Burkina Faso and the Niger, at the request of the three Heads of State, visited the Lake Chad Basin Commission in N’Djamena to discuss the establishment of a joint security force to more effectively control the borders shared by the three countries and to enhance their capacity to combat terrorism. Meanwhile, Operation Barkhane, conducted by French forces, remained under way in the region, one element of which was to provide support for forces of Mali and Burkina Faso in their efforts to search for terrorists in the Soum province of Burkina Faso. On 13 April, at its 679th meeting, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union endorsed the strategic concept of operations for the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel) and authorized the deployment of the Joint Force, comprising some 5,000 military, police and civilian personnel, for an initial period of 12 months. It also requested the United Nations Security Council to authorize the deployment of the force.

2. In Nigeria, a surge in patrols and a scaling-up of the Niger Delta amnesty programme, as well as more vigorous outreach by the Government, under the leadership of the Vice-President, Yemi Osinbajo, led to a significant reduction in the number of violent incidents in the Niger Delta region. However, the continued detention without trial of the leader of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria, Sheikh Ibraheem Zakzaky, despite a court ordering his release in December 2016, triggered further clashes between security forces and members of the Movement. In addition, violent clashes between farmers and pastoralists in the Middle Belt and other regions continued to strain intercommunal relations. From January to April, clashes between farmers and pastoralists resulted in over 700 deaths. Violent confrontations between pastoralists and farmers were also observed in other West African countries, including Ghana and Benin.

3. The production and trafficking of drugs remained a source of instability. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Joint Airport Interdiction Task Force of the Airport Communication Project (AIRCOP), a multi-agency anti-trafficking initiative, seized over 7 kilograms of cocaine between January and March in Mali alone. In addition, there were reports of an increase in cannabis production and consumption, as well as in methamphetamine trafficking in the region. Moreover, on 10 April, the Chair of ECOWAS, the President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, called on ECOWAS member States to strengthen regulatory regimes and enforce legislation against the counterfeiting of pharmaceuticals in the region.

4. Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea remained a significant challenge. A shift in piracy tactics was noted, from theft of cargo to hijackings for ransom. Of the 27 maritime crew members kidnapped for ransom worldwide between January and March, 17 were abducted off the coast of Nigeria.

I. Introduction

1. Dans une lettre datée du 29 décembre 2016 (S/2016/1129), le Conseil de sécurité a prorogé le mandat du Bureau des Nations Unies pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest (UNOWAS) jusqu’au 31 décembre 2019 et m’a prié de lui rendre compte, tous les six mois, de l’exécution du mandat du Bureau. Le présent rapport, qui porte sur la période allant du 1er janvier au 30 juin 2017, donne un aperçu de l’évolution de la situation et des tendances observées en Afrique de l’Ouest et au Sahel, et des précisions sur les activités du Bureau et les progrès accomplis dans la mise en œuvre de la stratégie intégrée des Nations Unies pour le Sahel.

II. Évolutions et tendances observées en Afrique de l’Ouest et au Sahel

1. La période considérée a été caractérisée par le règlement pacifique de la crise postélectorale en Gambie, les initiatives prises par les autorités nationales pour favoriser le développement à Cabo Verde et au Ghana, et les réformes politiques et la préparation des élections au Libéria, en Sierra Leone et au Sénégal. Si certains progrès ont été accomplis dans la lutte contre le terrorisme et l’extrémisme violent, la situation en matière de sécurité en Afrique de l’Ouest et au Sahel demeure fragile. Les activités terroristes et la criminalité transfrontalière, notamment la piraterie, le trafic de drogues et d’armes et la traite d’êtres humains, continuent de menacer gravement la stabilité de la région. Malgré les mesures prises au niveau régional pour lutter contre Boko Haram, la poursuite des violences a aggravé la crise humanitaire et le déficit de développement dans le bassin du lac Tchad. Le déplacement réalisé par une délégation du Conseil de sécurité sur le terrain du 2 au 7 mars 2017 a permis de dresser le bilan de la situation et de faire prendre conscience de la crise. Il a donné lieu à l’adoption de la résolution 2349 (2017) le 31 mars. Par ailleurs, à la cinquante et unième session ordinaire du Sommet des chefs d’État et de gouvernement de la Communauté économique des États d’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO), tenu à Monrovia le 4 juin, le Président togolais, Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé, a été élu Président de la Communauté.

   A. Politique et gouvernance

2. Le 19 janvier 2017, le Président gambien, Adama Barrow, a prêté serment à l’ambassade de Gambie à Dakar, où il s’était installé temporairement pour des raisons de sécurité après le refus de l’ancien Président, Yahya Jammeh, d’accepter sa défaite à l’élection présidentielle tenue le 1er décembre 2016. Les efforts diplomatiques déployés par les chefs d’État et de gouvernement des pays membres de la CEDEAO avec l’appui de mon Représentant spécial pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest et le Sahel, ont, conformément à la résolution 2337 (2017) du Conseil de sécurité, conduit l’ancien Président à quitter le pays le 21 janvier 2017. Le 26 janvier, le Président Barrow est retourné en Gambie et a commencé d’axer ses efforts sur la mise en place d’un nouveau gouvernement, l’organisation et le bon déroulement des élections législatives et l’élaboration d’une vision commune pour le pays, en concertation avec les membres de la coalition au pouvoir. Aux élections législatives, tenues le 6 avril, le Parti démocratique uni – parti de la coalition au pouvoir dirigé par l’actuel Ministre des affaires étrangères, A. N. M. Ousainou Darboe – a obtenu la majorité absolue à l’Assemblée nationale.

3. À Cabo Verde, le Gouvernement, dirigé par le Premier Ministre, José Ulisses Correia e Silva, a appliqué son programme de réforme axé sur la privatisation, la décentralisation et les investissements dans le secteur du tourisme.

4. Au Ghana, le Président, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, a nommé 54 ministres et vice-ministres au Gouvernement, portant le nombre total de ministres à 110, contre 78 dans le Gouvernement précédent. Le Gouvernement s’est immédiatement mis au travail en donnant la priorité à la création d’emplois, la stabilisation économique, l’instauration d’un environnement favorable aux entreprises, la relance du secteur agricole et l’investissement dans celui de la santé.

5. En Côte d’Ivoire, un nouveau Gouvernement, dirigé par le Premier Ministre, Amadou Gon Coulibaly, a été nommé le 11 janvier. Conformément aux dispositions approuvées à l’issue du référendum constitutionnel tenu en octobre 2016, Daniel Kablan Duncan, qui avait été Premier Ministre lors du premier mandat du Président Alassane Ouattara, a été nommé au poste nouvellement créé de Vice-Président. Depuis janvier, le pays connaît une série de révoltes et de mutineries de soldats exigeant une indemnisation financière de l’État. Ces faits mettent en lumière les difficultés auxquelles continue de se heurter la réforme du secteur de la sécurité.

6. En Guinée, l’opposition a déploré que les élections locales ne se soient pas tenues en février, comme le prévoyait l’accord politique du 12 octobre 2016 conclu entre le Gouvernement et l’opposition. Plusieurs mesures doivent encore être prises avant que ces élections puissent être organisées, notamment l’approbation par la Cour constitutionnelle d’un projet de loi portant réforme du Code électoral.

7. Au Sénégal, les élections législatives du 30 juillet se préparent. Le 3 janvier, l’Assemblée nationale a apporté des modifications à la loi électorale, notamment en ajoutant 15 sièges parlementaires pour représenter la diaspora. L’arrestation et la mise en examen pour fraude, le 7 mars, du maire de Dakar, Khalifa Sall, possible candidat à l’élection présidentielle de 2019, ont suscité un vif débat sur l’indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire.

8. En Sierra Leone, le Président, Ernest Bai Koroma, a annoncé, le 14 février, que les élections présidentielle et législatives se tiendraient le 7 mars 2018 et qu’un référendum constitutionnel serait organisé en septembre 2017.

9. Au Libéria, les préparatifs se sont poursuivis en vue de l’élection présidentielle du 10 octobre.

10. Au Togo, le Gouvernement a pris un certain nombre de mesures importantes en ce qui concerne la tenue des élections locales, trop longtemps différées, et les réformes en suspens prévues par l’accord politique global de 2006. En particulier, la commission nationale de réflexion sur les réformes politiques, constitutionnelles et institutionnelles a été créée le 3 janvier et chargée de proposer des réformes en concertation avec le Haut-Commissariat à la réconciliation et au renforcement de l’unité nationale. En mars, des victimes des violences politiques qu’a connues le pays entre 1958 et 2005 ont commencé à percevoir une indemnisation, conformément aux recommandations de la Commission vérité, justice et réconciliation. En outre, le 19 janvier, un conseil national de suivi de la décentralisation a été créé et la Haute Autorité de prévention et de lutte contre la corruption et les infractions assimilées a débuté ses travaux. Toutefois, les responsables de l’opposition ont dénoncé l’insuffisance des mesures et à nouveau réclamé la tenue d’élections locales.

11. Au Bénin, l’Assemblée nationale n’a pas obtenu la majorité requise pour pouvoir examiner les réformes constitutionnelles proposées par le Président, Patrice Athanase Guillaume Talon, dont la mise en place du mandat présidentiel unique de six ans, le financement public des partis politiques et l’interdiction de la détention provisoire et de la garde à vue pour les présidents et membres du gouvernement en exercice.

12. Au Burkina Faso, alors que se dégradaient les conditions de sécurité, avec pour corollaire des manifestations du personnel de police, le Président, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, a nommé, le 20 février, Jean-Claude Bouda Ministre de la défense. Une semaine plus tard, il a également remplacé les chefs de la police et des forces armées. En outre, un nouveau ministère de la sécurité a été créé en février et des mesures ont été prises pour mettre à exécution un plan stratégique pour la réforme du secteur de la défense pour la période 2017-2021. La Commission constitutionnelle ayant mis la dernière main aux propositions de réforme constitutionnelle le 10 janvier, des consultations régionales ont été tenues entre le 18 mars et le 20 avril. Un référendum sur l’adoption de ces propositions devrait être organisé dans le courant de 2017.

13. Au Niger, la situation politique a continué d’être marquée par des tensions entre la majorité au pouvoir et l’opposition. Les élections locales qui devaient avoir lieu en janvier ont été reportées sine die. Le candidat de l’opposition présent au second tour de l’élection présidentielle de 2016, Hama Amadou, a été condamné par contumace à un an de prison le 13 mars dans une affaire de trafic d’enfants. Le 21 avril, à la suite d’une série de grèves étudiantes, dont certaines ont été marquées par de violents affrontements avec les forces de sécurité, le Gouvernement a signé avec des représentants des étudiants un accord dans lequel il s’est engagé à réduire les arriérés de paiement des bourses d’études et à investir dans la construction de nouvelles infrastructures universitaires. En outre, dans le cadre d’un remaniement ministériel, le Président a décidé le 18 avril que la Ministre de l’emploi, du travail et de la sécurité sociale deviendrait Ministre de l’enseignement supérieur, de la recherche et de l’innovation, et vice versa.

14. En Mauritanie, le 17 mars, le Sénat a rejeté un projet de loi portant réforme de la Constitution, qui prévoyait la suppression du Sénat, d’importants changements touchant le Conseil constitutionnel et la Haute Cour de justice, ainsi qu’une modification du drapeau national. Le projet de loi avait été adopté à la majorité de l’Assemblée nationale une semaine plus tôt. Le 20 avril, le Conseil des ministres a pris un décret fixant les modalités pratiques d’un référendum sur le projet de loi, qui doit se tenir le 15 juillet. 

15. Au Nigéria, le 5 avril, dans le sillage d’une série de manifestations contre les difficultés socioéconomiques dont plusieurs villes ont été le théâtre, le Président, Muhammadu Buhari, a lancé le Plan de redressement économique et de croissance 2017-2020. Le Gouvernement a également poursuivi ses efforts de lutte contre la corruption. C’est dans ce contexte que le Chef de l’Agence nationale de renseignement et le Secrétaire du Gouvernement de la Fédération ont été suspendus le 19 avril pour détournement de fonds publics. En dépit de ces avancées, ce sont les absences prolongées du Président, parti à l’étranger pour raisons médicales, qui ont été au cœur du débat politique.

B. Évolution des conditions de sécurité

1. L’instabilité qui touche le Mali continue de se propager dans le nord-est du Burkina Faso et l’ouest du Niger. Le 2 mars, Al-Qaida au Maghreb islamique, la brigade Al Mourabitoun, Ansar Eddine et le Front de libération du Macina ont fusionné pour former le Groupe de soutien à l’islam et aux musulmans, nouvelle alliance composée de dirigeants de différentes origines ethniques. Le Groupe a déjà revendiqué plusieurs attaques meurtrières contre la Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA) et les forces maliennes, et devrait continuer de perpétrer des attentats. Au Burkina Faso, pendant le premier trimestre de l’année, le nombre d’attentats terroristes commis contre des cibles civiles et militaires a augmenté.  Au Niger, les actes de terrorisme et d’extrémisme violent ne se sont pas cantonnés au nord du pays et ont contribué aux activités militantes menées par Boko Haram dans le sud. Le 26 avril, des représentants de l’Autorité de développement intégré de la région du LiptakoGourma, organisation régionale qui œuvre au développement des zones limitrophes du Mali, du Burkina Faso et du Niger, s’est rendue, à la demande des chefs d’État des trois pays, à la Commission du bassin du lac Tchad, à N’Djamena, pour discuter de la mise en place d’une force de sécurité conjointe afin de contrôler plus efficacement les frontières communes de ces pays et de renforcer leurs capacités de lutte contre le terrorisme. Par ailleurs, l’Opération Barkhane, conduite par les forces françaises, a été poursuivie dans la région, notamment pour aider les forces maliennes et burkinabé dans leurs activités de recherche de terroristes dans la province burkinabé du Soum. Le 13 avril, à sa 679e séance, le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine a approuvé le concept stratégique d’opérations de la Force conjointe du Groupe de cinq pays du Sahel (G5 Sahel) et autorisé le déploiement de la Force, comptant quelque 5 000 soldats, policiers et civils, pour une période initiale de 12 mois. Il a également demandé au Conseil de sécurité de l’Organisation des Nations Unies d’autoriser ce déploiement.

2. Au Nigéria, grâce à la mobilisation de patrouilles supplémentaires et à l’extension du programme d’amnistie du delta du Niger, ainsi qu’à une campagne de communication plus dynamique du Gouvernement, menée sous la houlette du VicePrésident Yemi Osinbajo, les actes de violence ont sensiblement diminué dans la région du delta du Niger. Toutefois, le maintien en détention du cheik Ibraheem Zakzaky, dirigeant du Mouvement islamique en Nigéria, en dépit d’une décision de justice ordonnant sa libération en décembre 2016, a déclenché de nouveaux affrontements entre les forces de sécurité et des membres du Mouvement. En outre, des heurts violents opposant des agriculteurs et des éleveurs dans la ceinture centrale et d’autres régions continuent de créer des tensions entre les communautés. De janvier à avril, ces heurts ont fait plus de 700 morts. On a observé des affrontements similaires dans d’autres pays d’Afrique de l’Ouest, notamment au Ghana et au Bénin.

3. La production et le trafic de drogues demeurent une source d’instabilité. Selon l’Office des Nations Unies contre la drogue et le crime (ONUDC), l’équipe aéroportuaire conjointe chargée des interceptions du Projet de communication aéroportuaire (AIRCOP), initiative interorganisations de lutte contre les trafics, a saisi plus de 7 kilogrammes de cocaïne entre janvier et mars, rien qu’au Mali. En outre, il a été fait état d’une augmentation de la production et de la consommation de cannabis dans la région, ainsi que du trafic de méthamphétamine. Par ailleurs, le 10 avril, la Présidente de la CEDEAO, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Présidente du Libéria, a appelé les États membres de la Communauté à renforcer leurs régimes réglementaires et à appliquer la législation visant à lutter contre la contrefaçon de médicaments dans la région.

4. La sûreté maritime du golfe de Guinée reste un défi de taille. On a noté une évolution des tactiques de piraterie, celles-ci étant passées du vol de marchandises au détournement contre rançon. Sur les 27 membres d’équipage enlevés contre rançon dans le monde entre janvier et mars, 17 l’ont été au large des côtes nigérianes.

July 2017

Desmidt, S., Hauck, V. 2017. Gestion des conflits dans le cadre de l'Architecture africaine de la paix et de sécurité (APSA). (Document de réflexion 211). Maastricht : ECDPM.

Au travers de ce document de réflexion, nous entendons éclairer le débat sur des activités menées par les organisations régionales africaines afin de promouvoir la paix et la sécurité, en l’espèce la diplomatie, la médiation et les opérations de soutien à la paix (OSP) déployées dans le cadre de l’Architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité (APSA). Ce travail s’inscrit dans un engagement à plus long terme de l’ECDPM, un projet d’analyse de l’impact de l’APSA financé par le gouvernement allemand (plus précisément par la coopération internationale allemande, Deutsche Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)) et mené en collaboration avec l’Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) de l’Université d’Addis-Abeba.

Ce document s’adresse à tous ceux qui s’intéressent à l’Union africaine (UA) et aux efforts déployés par les organisations régionales africaines afin de promouvoir la paix et la sécurité sur le continent. Il s’adresse également aux décideurs politiques et aux praticiens qui souhaitent mettre leurs connaissances à jour ou se confronter à un autre point de vue sur les connaissances acquises. Les constatations qu’il livre sont le fruit d’un travail de recherche documentaire intensif, couvrant les années 2013 à 2015. À la lumière de cette recherche, il délivre 12 messages-clés, qui sont résumés en cinq grandes constatations.

6.3 million people to be assisted

334,013 Swiss francs DREF allocated

64.3 million Swiss Francs current Appeal budget

1.3 million Swiss Francs funding gap

Appeal launched 26 June 2014

Revision n° 7 issued 04 July 2017

Appeal ends December 2017

This revised Emergency Appeal seeks a total of 64.3 million Swiss francs (decreased from 90.5 million Swiss francs) to enable the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) to support the Sierra Leone Red Cross Society (SLRCS) to deliver recovery assistance and support to Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) affected populations (including EVD survivors, orphans and vulnerable children, affected households, Red Cross and community volunteers). The revised operation will focus on the following sectors: health (including community-based health (CBH) and psychosocial support - PSS); water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH); disaster risk reduction (DRR); food security and livelihoods and National Society Capacity Building (through community and institutional development strategies). The revision also reflects the completion of majority of activities with the financial support from the Government of Japan, UNDP and the Swedish Red Cross. The current funding gap is 1.3 million Swiss francs

Rainfall deficits persist over Kenya and Uganda

Africa Weather Hazards

1. Below-average rainfall since mid-May has led to abnormal dryness across eastern Uganda and southwestern Kenya. Moisture deficits are likely to negatively impact cropping and Pastoral activities.

2. Torrential rain led to destroyed houses in Central Darfur, Sudan. Heavy rain is forecast to continue during the next week. High flooding risks in the region continue.

Since 2010, the Freetown WASH Consortium – consisting of Oxfam, Action contre La Faim (ACF), Save the Children, Concern Worldwide and GOAL – has worked to decrease mortality and morbidity stemming from preventable WASH-related causes in Sierra Leone’s capital. Now in its third phase, the DFID-funded consortium is undertaking a range of integrated activities to improve access to drinkable water and adequate sanitation services, promote safe hygiene behaviours, build the capacity of duty-bearers in risk reduction and contingency planning, and lobby for pro-poor investment in WASH services.

This document outlines how the programme is implemented in partnership with government ministries, local authorities and the President’s Delivery Team, as well as how the programme adapted to the Ebola outbreak.

The Toolkit for Community Psychosocial Support (PSS) Workers is a compilation of tools for delivering services to children and adults in Sierra Leone.

The Toolkit takes into account IASC Guidelines and provides a range of resources that have been validated in Sierra Leone. Grounded in the Sierra Leonean context and drawn from all regions of the country, the Toolkit is not limited to the care of Ebola survivors and their families; the tools and skills provided are meant to be used if other crises arise in Sierra Leone, as well as for other projects seeking to promote the psychosocial wellbeing of people and their communities.

Accompanying the Toolkit is an Information Guide for Community PSS Workers, providing information that will enable PSS workers to understand the technical sections of the Toolkit in more detail.

Ce rapport présente les résultats d’une recherche sur l’intégrité de la réponse à la crise Ebola en Guinée ainsi que des éléments de comparaison avec la réponse en Sierra Leone, réalisée dans le cadre du projet CREATE (Collective Resolution to Enhance Accountability and Transparency in Emergencies) mené par Transparency International (TI) en partenariat avec Humanitarian Outcomes (HO) et le Groupe URD. Les objectifs de cette étude étaient d’analyser les risques sur l’intégrité rencontres par les acteurs humanitaires lors de la réponse à l’épidémie Ebola, de souligner les mesures préventives, outils et bonnes pratiques mises en oeuvre par ces acteurs pour assurer l’intégrité de leurs opérations et de proposer des recommandations pratiques aux acteurs humanitaires pour améliorer l’intégrité de leur réponse lors de crises similaires à l’avenir.

Cette étude a suivi une méthodologie d’analyse qualitative, comprenant des entretiens avec les acteurs et parties prenantes de la réponse, des consultations avec les communautés affectées ainsi que les témoignages du comité de pilotage inter-agences, impliquant institutions nationales et acteurs internationaux. L’équipe de recherche a parcouru l’ensemble des zones touchées par la crise Ebola en Guinée et réalisé une courte visite en Sierra Leone pour permettre certaines comparaisons.

L’épidémie Ebola est une crise particulière survenue dans un contexte fragile. Les pays touchés par la crise Ebola étaient en train de sortir d’années de conflit difficiles, de la présence de camps de réfugiés et de crises politiques importantes avec une multiplication des phases de grande tension quand l’épidémie de fièvre hémorragique liée au virus Ebola a touché la Guinée, la Sierra Leone et le Liberia. Cette crise sanitaire s’est caractérisée par une forte mortalité, notamment dès que la prise en charge est tardive et présente un important risque de contamination. La dynamique particulière que cette crise relève autant de l’ouverture récente des milieux forestiers vers l’extérieur (routes, marchés, exode rurale) qui favorise les échanges vers les villes et zones non forestières que de la faiblesse des systèmes de santé.

La société bien spécifique des pays forestiers de la région de la Rivière Mano représente un contexte socioculturel particulier dans lequel la définition d’une telle maladie et l’explication de ses paramètres épidémiologiques demandent des efforts de compréhension (comme les pratiques de gestion des corps ou les interactions avec la médecine traditionnelles de communication spécifiques qui ont largement manqué au début de la crise et créé des dangers pour les acteurs en première ligne. L’absence de vaccins et de médicaments spécifiques explique que l’on en est encore au traitement symptomatique et à l’appui aux capacités des individus (nutrition, hydratation, lutte contre les maladies associées) qui sont d’autant plus efficaces si le patient est pris en charge rapidement.

Toutefois, la réponse à Ebola a dû prendre en compte des défis à différents niveaux :

• Au niveau des communautés avec le rejet des soignants, mais aussi la stigmatisation des malades et de leurs familles ;

• Au niveau des pays voisins avec l’embargo et le blocage des frontières qui ont fortement entravé la réponse.

• Au niveau de la communauté internationale qui a commencé à réellement s’inquiéter et réagir quand les premiers cas ont été observés sur d’autres continents 6

Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) is a research and policy nonprofit that discovers and promotes effective solutions to global poverty problems. IPA brings together researchers and decision-makers to design, rigorously evaluate, and refine these solutions and their applications, ensuring that the evidence created is used to improve the lives of the world’s poor. Since our founding in 2002, IPA has worked with over 575 leading academics to conduct over 650 evaluations in 51 countries. This research has informed hundreds of successful programs that now impact millions of individuals worldwide. Future growth will be concentrated in focus countries, such as Sierra Leone, where we have local and international staff, established relationships with government, NGOs, and the private sector, and deep knowledge of local issues.

More evidence

A truth and reconciliation program increased forgiveness, but worsened mental health. A community-based reconciliation program increased forgiveness toward perpetrators of crimes and significantly increased trust in ex-combatants, but it also worsened psychological wellbeing—increasing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and anxiety.

Exposure to political debates bolstered voters’ knowledge and changed voting behavior. Watching debates substantially increased political knowledge, policy alignment, and vote shares for higherquality candidates. The debates also encouraged politicians to invest more in their constituencies, both during the campaign and one year later.

A community driven development program helped establish village organizations, but after nearly four years had not changed institutions or decision-making. The program led to positive short-run effects on local public goods provision and economic outcomes, but no sustained impacts on collective action, decision-making processes, or the involvement of marginalized groups like women in local affairs. Given that institutional change can take a long period of time to become visible, researchers have conducted a follow-up in 2016, with results from this survey expected in 2017.

Participants at the restricted PREGEC meeting made the following statement:

1. Despite good food supplies, the Sahel and West Africa remain marked by persistent food insecurity, exacerbated by the resurgence of armed attacks in the Lake Chad basin, in northern Mali and in the Liptako-Gourma region, which covers parts of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Based on the Cadre harmonisé’s projections for the June-August lean season, nearly 13.8 million people are food and nutrition insecure (phases 3 to 5). Of these, 1.6 million are in the emergency phase, mainly in Mali, Niger, northern Nigeria, Senegal and Chad, while some 50 000 people in Borno state, in northern Nigeria are experiencing famine. An increasing number of children are suffering from severe and moderate acute malnutrition linked to the reduced levels of care in health centres. In response to this situation, States and their partners continue to rally together to help vulnerable populations. Unfortunately, mobilised resources in support of these populations remain relatively low, in terms of providing food assistance, protecting livelihoods and fighting malnutrition.

2. Agricultural markets have experienced an increase in dry cereal prices (8-24%) across the region, except in Benin, Cabo Verde and Chad. This increase could adversely affect poor and very poor households who depend on these markets during this period of high demand. Prices in livestock markets declined sharply in Chad and Niger due to falling exports to Cameroon, Central African Republic, Nigeria and Libya. The civil unrest in northern Nigeria and in the Liptako-Gourma region has also made some markets inaccessible. In other areas, cattle markets are functioning normally and prices are rising.

3. Overall, the 2017-18 agropastoral season has been marked by an early start to the season, except in some parts of Liberia and Sierra Leone where delays have been observed. Torrential rains have already been recorded in some areas, causing floods, significant property damage and at least 25 deaths - 11 in Côte d’Ivoire and 14 in Niger.

4. Looking ahead, the current agropastoral season is expected to experience normal to excessive rainfall with the risk of many dry spells during the planting phase.
   Meanwhile, above-average levels of water are also expected in most of the region’s river basins, particularly in the Senegal River and the Niger River valleys, where flooding is likely to occur.

5. In the framework of the agricultural and food information monitoring system, several countries will experience difficulties in conducting national analyses with the Cadre harmonisé, if appropriate arrangements are not made to monitor the agropastoral campaign’s progress and to collect data on agriculture, food security and nutrition.

Insights from the Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism initiative (4Mi) in Mali and Niger

Executive Summary

• The Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism initiative (4Mi) collects data on the conditions of mixed migration movements across various regions. It is implemented by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat.

• The pilot phase of 4Mi in Niger and Mali, on which the present report is based, illustrates the conditions and protection risks faced by people moving north from West Africa before they cross the Sahara Desert towards North Africa.

• While the data presented in this report is not representative of the overall movement of people north from West Africa through Niger and Mali, it does give a preliminary insight into the conditions of movements and highlights some of the protection risks faced by people on the move. A number of areas have been raised that will benefit from further examination as more data is collected and 4Mi expands to other areas in West Africa.

• In line with the existing literature, the majority of respondents reported moving for economic reasons primarily related to increasing employment opportunities. This points to the lack, or perceived lack, of secure income as a significant factor in people’s decisions to move. However, movements across the region occur in a context of contemporary forms of persecution and exclusion, including deteriorating livelihood opportunities due to con icts in certain areas, prolonged marginalization and relative poverty. People touched by such issues may nevertheless express their motivations for moving as primarily economic.

• The specific influence of forced displacement on the wider dynamics of mobility in the region is difficult to estimate. It is possible that, as insecurity in Northern Mali and the Lake Chad region becomes more protracted and continues to prevent returns, secondary movement may become more significant.

• Despite the ECOWAS free movement policies in force, people interviewed by 4Mi reported hin- drances in crossing borders in the region, often for attempting to enter or exit a country illegally. In many cases, relatively small bribes had to be paid to facilitate onward movement.

• The number of severe protection incidents reported is relatively low compared to other mixed migration routes, particularly the western route out of the Horn of Africa through Sudan, but also in Libya, towards which many of the respondents continue their journey from West Africa.

• Authorities and security o cers play a central role in a large number of incidents. In addition to the involvement of authorities in bribery and detention at borders, the largest percentage of mild physical and verbal abuse recorded by 4Mi was carried out by security officers or police, followed by smugglers.

• The border between Niger and Burkina Faso emerged as an area with a comparatively high number of protection incidents. Multiple accounts of abuse and detention were reported to take place here, highlighting Burkina Faso as an under examined country of transit.

• The continuation and potential expansion of 4Mi in the region, as well as in Libya, will be informed by these preliminary insights and will continue to provide in-depth and timely information on mixed migration movements through crucial transit locations in the region. Comparative analysis with 4Mi data form Libya/the Maghreb, Eastern, Northern and Southern Africa will provide further insight.

This brief summarizes FEWS NET’s most forward-looking analysis of projected emergency food assistance needs in FEWS NET coverage countries. The projected size of each country’s acutely food insecure population (IPC Phase 3 and higher) is compared to last year and the recent five-year average and categorized as Higher ( p), Similar ( u), or Lower ( ). Countries where external emergency food assistance needs are anticipated are identified. Projected lean season months highlighted in red indicate either an early start or an extension to the typical lean season. Additional information is provided for countries with large food insecure populations, an expectation of high severity, or where other key issues warrant additional discussion. Analytical confidence is lower in remote monitoring countries, denoted by “RM”. Visit www.fews.net for detailed country reports.